United Nations S/PV.3824

Security Council
Fifty-second Year

Provisional

3824th Meeting
Monday, 20 October 1997, 11.40 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Somavía	(Chile)
Members:	China	Mr. Liu Jieyi
	Costa Rica	Mr. Sáenz Biolley
	Egypt	Mr. Abdel Aziz
	France	Mr. Dejammet
	Guinea-Bissau	Mr. Cabral
	Japan	Mr. Konishi
	Kenya	Mr. Rana
	Poland	Mr. Wlosowicz
	Portugal	Mr. Soares
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Yung Woo Chun
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Sweden	Mr. Dahlgren
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir John Weston
	United States of America	Mr. Richardson

Agenda

The situation in Croatia

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (S/1997/767)

97-86266 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 11.40 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Croatia

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (S/1997/767)

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Croatia, Germany and Italy, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Šimonović (Croatia) took a seat at the Council table; Mr. Henze (Germany) and Mr. Fulci (Italy) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, contained in document S/1997/767.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to documents S/1997/745 and S/1997/772, which contain the text of the letters dated 24 September and 3 October 1997, respectively, from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 2 October 1997 (S/1997/767), on the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), and agrees with its balanced and objective assessment.

"The Security Council notes with approval several positive actions taken by the Government of Croatia which are contained in the report, as well as those which have occurred since the report was issued. These developments include the recent agreements relating to education, progress on the reintegration of the judiciary, the law on convalidation, moves towards recognition of pensioner service, assistance to local governments and municipalities, and provision to UNTAES of documentation on 25 war crimes cases. The Council is also encouraged by the increased cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The Council expects the Government of Croatia to continue to build upon these positive steps and accelerate its efforts in order fully to complete these initiatives.

"The Security Council welcomes the recent establishment by the Government of Croatia of a programme for national reconciliation. A final assessment of this programme must await its full and prompt implementation.

"The Security Council continues to note with concern that there are still many outstanding areas and issues of contention and non-compliance, which require further, urgent action from the Government of Croatia. The Council reiterates its call to the Government of Croatia to curb media attacks on ethnic groups. The Council also underlines, in particular, the importance of the removal of all legal and administrative barriers, thus allowing the accelerated voluntary two-way return of displaced persons, including their right to choose to live in the region, as well as the return of refugees. It calls upon the Government of Croatia to give immediate effect to recent decisions of the Constitutional Court regarding the Law on the Temporary Takeover and Administration of Specified Property, and to take further action to promote the safe return of owners to their homes and the resolution of the issue of lost tenancy rights, including ensuring access to reconstruction assistance.

"Much progress in these and other outstanding areas must be made on an urgent basis, in order for the Government of Croatia to comply fully with its obligations and create the conditions for a successful completion of UNTAES. For its part, the local Serb population must also take more active measures to participate in the reintegration process.

"The Security Council notes the urgent need for all local government bodies in the region, particularly the City Council of Vukovar, to commence full normal functions immediately.

"The Security Council expresses its concern about the behaviour of some officers of the Transitional Police Force, and urges full cooperation with UNTAES in improving the performance of this Force. The Council approves the intention of the Secretary-General to retain United Nations civilian police and military observers at current levels to the end of the UNTAES mandate. The Council also notes the need to address concerns relating to the continuation of police monitoring functions.

"The Security Council welcomes the close cooperation between UNTAES and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in expanding the long-term mission of the OSCE in Croatia.

"The Security Council shares the assessment of the Secretary-General that there is sufficient time for Croatia to comply fully with its obligations and commitments before 15 January 1998 and urges the Government of Croatia to redouble its efforts in the time remaining. The Council looks forward to the next report of the Secretary-General on all aspects relevant to the peaceful reintegration of the region, due by the beginning of December."

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/1997/48.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.3825

Security Council

Fifty-second Year

Provisional

3825th Meeting

Monday, 20 October 1997, 11.50 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Somavía	(Chile)
Members:	China	Mr. Liu Jieyi
	Costa Rica	Mr. Sáenz Biolley
	Egypt	Mr. Abdel Aziz
	France	Mr. Dejammet
	Guinea-Bissau	Mr. Cabral
	Japan	Mr. Konishi
	Kenya	Mr. Rana
	Poland	Mr. Wlosowicz
	Portugal	Mr. Soares
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Yung Woo Chun
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Sweden	Mr. Dahlgren
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir John Weston
	United States of America	Mr. Richardson

Agenda

The situation concerning Western Sahara

97-86278 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 11.50 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation concerning Western Sahara

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/1997/806, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations.

It is my understanding that the Security Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. If I hear no objection, I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Chile, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1133 (1997).

In order to implement this resolution, the Council requests the Secretary-General to name a Special Representative as soon as possible, and calls upon the parties to cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General throughout the implementation of the settlement plan.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.3826

Security Council

Fifty-second Year

Provisional

3826th Meeting

Thursday, 23 October 1997, 4 p.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Somavía	(Chile)
Members:	China	Mr. Liu Jieyi
	Costa Rica	Mr. Berrocal Soto
	Egypt	Mr. Elaraby
	France	Mr. Dejammet
	Guinea-Bissau	Mr. Cabral
	Japan	Mr. Owada
	Kenya	Mr. Rana
	Poland	Mr. Matuszewski
	Portugal	Mr. Monteiro
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Park
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Sweden	Mr. Dahlgren
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir John Weston
	United States of America	Mr. Richardson

Agenda

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Note by the Secretary-General (S/1997/774)

97-86308 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 4.25 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

Note by the Secretary-General (S/1997/774)

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the note by the Secretary-General contained in document S/1997/774 transmitting the report of the Executive Chairman on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Members of the Council also have before them document S/1997/816, which contains the text of the draft resolution submitted by Chile, Costa Rica, Japan, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Sir John Weston (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): The resolution which is before us, co-sponsored by the United Kingdom and eight other members of this Council, is in direct response to continued Iraqi obstruction of the Special Commission (UNSCOM) in the execution of the mandate given to it by this Council, in contravention of the demands of Security Council resolution 1115 (1997), adopted unanimously by the Council on 21 June 1997.

In that resolution, the Council stated its firm intention to impose additional measures on those Iraqi officials responsible for instances of non-cooperation with the Special Commission and those which had not allowed the Special Commission's inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi facilities and personnel. The incidents described by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission in his report of 6 October 1997 show that the Iraqi regime chose to ignore that warning.

We, together with our fellow co-sponsors, believe, therefore, that the Council should react robustly to continued Iraqi flouting of Security Council resolutions. We further believe that the resolution on which we are about to vote is a reasonable, proportionate and focused response to repeated Iraqi failures.

It contains a firm and consistent decision which builds on and develops the firmly stated intention in resolution 1115 (1997) "to impose additional measures". It spells out those measures — what they are and to whom they will apply — while generously providing a further opportunity over the next six months for Iraq to demonstrate by its good faith that they are unnecessary. It begins straight away the process of designating, on the basis of incidents recorded since the adoption of resolution 1115 (1997), who some of the targeted individuals would be, so that action on paragraph 6 of the resolution could begin at once, if needed. It also postpones any further sanctions reviews until next April, because Iraq's obstruction has made it impossible for the Special Commission to complete its work.

The basis for these decisions is clearly set out in the resolution. It expresses grave concern at the additional incidents of Iraqi refusal to allow UNSCOM access to sites in Iraq since the passage of resolution 1115 (1997). It condemns these incidents, as well as the endangering of the safety of UNSCOM staff, the destruction of documents of interest to the Special Commission and the interference with the freedom of movement of UNSCOM personnel. It decides that these incidents of Iraqi non-compliance are a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions. It notes that, in his report, the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission was unable to advise this Council that Iraq was in substantial compliance with the demands of resolution 1115 (1997).

To us and our fellow co-sponsors this provides adequate justification to move forward from the decision we took in June. We shall regret it if a few Council members, for whatever reasons of their own, are unable to subscribe to this view. We have worked hard and in good faith to accommodate all members' preoccupations on the text. But we were not willing to compromise the

underlying purpose of the resolution or the responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council in order to appease Iraq — an Iraq, by the way, whose spokesmen have unwisely tried to threaten and intimidate the United Nations in recent days.

This Council will not be deflected from its course by unacceptable Iraqi attempts at blackmail. The message which needs to be sent clearly is that if the Government of Iraq chooses to challenge the will and authority of the United Nations Security Council, it can be sure of a firm and principled response. If Iraq has not yet understood this, it has understood nothing.

The United Kingdom, for its part, remains determined to ensure that Iraq complies fully with the decision of the international community that it should give up its weapons of mass destruction and any ambitions it may have to retain or acquire them. This can only be achieved if Saddam Hussain takes the political decision to cooperate fully with the Special Commission. The regularity with which this Council has had to address this issue confirms that this decision has still not been taken. All we have heard from the Iraqi regime for the past six and half years are lies and empty promises, while on the ground they have actively obstructed the Special Commission and concealed from it details of its illegal weapons programmes. These facts are borne out in the latest report of the Special Commission, which clearly states that, while progress has been made, serious deficiencies remain in all three weapons areas, in particular on chemical and biological warfare agents.

The United Kingdom congratulates the Executive Chairman and his staff for the progress which has been made. In the light of Iraqi behaviour, it is nonsense to suggest that Iraq deserves to share the credit. The progress which has been achieved is due solely to the dedication of numerous international experts drawn from many Member States, for whom Iraqi harassment, obstruction, lies and half-truths have been and continue to be a daily fare. The Special Commission and its staff will continue to have our full support.

Let us be clear that until and unless Iraq cooperates with the Special Commission and tells the whole truth about its programmes of illegal weapons of mass destruction, there can be no prospect of the Council considering whether the demands of Section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) have been met. The reviews for that purpose remain in suspension.

Finally, this is not a sanctions review. But on this occasion it is worth reminding ourselves that Iraq has still failed to meet its obligations on missing Kuwaiti prisoners of war, property and the national archives of Kuwait. For the United Kingdom, the successful resolution of these issues is no less important than that of the destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. It is high time for Iraq to commit itself to addressing seriously these matters as well.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The Security Council is meeting today to consider the reports submitted by UNSCOM and by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to follow up on the Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq and to examine whether Iraq has discharged its obligations vis-à-vis these two authorities to attain the objectives determined by the relevant Security Council resolutions, and in order to adopt the necessary measures and recommendations to ensure that Iraq cooperates with the Council on this matter.

We have heard with keen interest the assessment given by Mr. Hans Blix, Director-General of the IAEA, to the Council. He has informed us of the progress made by the Iraqi Government with regard to nuclear matters and has pointed out that it is advisable to obtain greater cooperation on the part of that Government in order to conclude pending questions, so that the IAEA can present a report on the completion of its technical functions.

We have listened with equal attention to the report presented to the Council by Mr. Richard Butler, Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. He confirms the progress with regard to disarmament indicated in the report, especially in the area of missiles and chemical agents. In this connection, I should particularly like to emphasize the importance of paragraph 147 of the report:

> "It should be recognized that UNSCOM has registered significant achievements in the disarmament field and is well launched in the field of monitoring."

On the basis of the two reports, Egypt has drawn certain conclusions that it would like to have seen included in the draft resolution before us today, with regard to the evaluation of the implementation of the Council's resolutions and the Council's future actions. Those conclusions are as follows.

First, notwithstanding the fact that the reports indicate certain negative aspects of Iraq's conduct, there are also some positive aspects that the draft resolution should have taken into account and credited to the Iraqi Government, because they give an indication of what UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have achieved so far that may provide us a foundation in the future — for example, the completion of the missiles investigation, the fact that it has been possible to establish the number of missiles in Iraq's possession and the achievements in the nuclear and chemical spheres.

Second, despite our wholehearted support for Ambassador Butler, for the Special Commission's mandate and for continued consultations with the Security Council on the best way of fulfilling that mandate, we wish to stress that the Council must be the only body responsible for making the right decision, following consultations and discussions, on the basis of reports submitted by the Special Commission.

Third, the reports that have been submitted and the comments made by the Director-General of the IAEA and by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission indicate that those two bodies deal with purely technical matters. The question of verifying what has been destroyed is a vital one and deserves the Council's attention. Although it is difficult, from the purely technical standpoint of the IAEA and the Special Commission, to assert that nothing remains to be destroyed, it is important that the Council take a clear decision defining the ultimate goal of the activities of those two bodies in order that the Council's resolutions can be fully implemented in detail.

Fourth, the evaluation of the extent to which Iraq implements the Security Council's resolutions is determined by those resolutions. There is no doubt about this, but it still depends on the arrangements, measures and modalities determined by the Special Commission in consultation with the Government of Iraq, which has sovereignty over its own territory. Though the Security Council has not formally adopted such arrangements and modalities, they are set forth in the reports of the Special Commission, of which the Council has taken note, and they have therefore become an integral part of the machinery in place for evaluating the extent to which Iraq implements the Council's resolutions. This is why the difference of opinion between the Special Commission and Iraq with regard to the interpretation of these modalities and the manner of implementing them demands that we take the time to study the question objectively. Iraq must cooperate even further and implement what has been agreed, and the Special Commission, for its part, must make an effort to cooperate in establishing clear-cut modalities so that it can fully discharge its responsibilities and submit a good assessment to the Council.

Fifth, assessing the manner in which Iraq is discharging its responsibilities means taking into consideration what the reports say: that only sporadically has Iraq not acted in conformity with Security Council resolutions. We must therefore ask the following questions: are we here faced with recurring, systematic non-cooperation with the Special Commission? Do the number of instances indicate a real pattern of unwillingness to comply with the Council's resolutions? During the period covered by the present report, the Executive Chairman notes that the Special Commission has made more than 860 inspections. In considering these isolated instances of differences between Iraq and the Commission over the manner of implementing the agreed modalities, we must study them objectively and precisely in order to decide whether they can be described as having been respected by Iraq or whether Iraq has not lived up to its commitments.

Sixth, Egypt is opposed in principle to the imposition of any additional sanctions against Iraq, since Iraq has, in our opinion, made further efforts in the past six months to cooperate with the Special Commission and the IAEA. Although the draft resolution now before us does serve notice on the Government of Iraq by threatening the imposition of special sanctions, we do not believe that any measure that the Council might take to prompt the Government of Iraq to cooperate further with the Special Commission should apply retroactively, since the proper legal interpretation of Security Council resolution 1115 (1997) is that the Council is prepared to impose additional measures if the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission advises it that Iraq is not in compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution. Should the Council today adopt a resolution based on the report of the Executive Chairman dated 6 October 1997, the date of implementation of any measures should be that of the report submitted to the Council by the Special Commission, not the date of resolution 1115 (1997).

Seventh, the preparation of lists of individuals who have impeded the work of the Special Commission without specifying the person entrusted with preparing the lists or the modality of their preparation is ambiguous. The Council should have mandated the sanctions committee to determine clear criteria for the modalities for the implementation of the resolution, as well as the

respective roles of the Special Commission and the Iraqi Government in this connection, so that the Council could avoid contributing to aggravating the tensions between Iraq and the Special Commission, which would complicate the task of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Butler's functions as Executive Chairman would also be made more difficult, and he deserves all our support.

As a matter of principle, Egypt is also opposed to any measures that might increase tensions in the region, for that would not be in the short- or long-term interests of any State in the region. What we need to do today is to reaffirm the objectives of the Security Council's prior resolutions and to encourage Iraq to implement them precisely. That is why we call upon Iraq and the Special Commission to undertake further cooperation in a climate of calm and mutual respect.

I take this opportunity to recall once again the importance of settling pending questions concerning prisoners of war and Kuwaiti property, including Kuwaiti national archives. These are humanitarian questions that should be settled without delay.

In view of all that, this morning in informal consultations the Egyptian delegation made a point of asking that the calm and constructive dialogue in good faith that has been pursued in recent days with regard to the provisions of the draft resolution before us today be continued so as to take into account all proposals designed to achieve consensus in the Council on this important draft. However, the sponsors of the draft resolution insisted on its being put to the vote today without taking into consideration the majority of the proposals put forward in recent days, particularly the proposals made today so that the draft resolution would respect logic, legality and the provisions of resolution 1115 (1997), and so that it might, once adopted, inspire the Iraqi Government to cooperate more fully with the Special Commission.

All these reasons have prompted the Government of Egypt to reconsider its position. For that reason, we shall abstain in the voting on the draft resolution.

Mr. Monteiro (Portugal): The work of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) is fundamental to achieving the goals that the Council established in adopting resolution 687 (1991). Full cooperation on the part of the Iraqi authorities is essential to this process.

The Security Council must be consistent in its decisions. We cannot forget why resolution 1115 (1997) was adopted last June. The Council must take a firm stand in order to send a clear signal that it cannot tolerate further incidents, such as those reported by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, which prevent UNSCOM from carrying out its mission.

We acknowledge that Iraq has been offering some degree of cooperation to UNSCOM lately. But, at the same time, obstruction of UNSCOM inspections has continued. This is unacceptable. Nothing less than full cooperation by Iraq with the Special Commission will enable it to fulfil its task.

We agree with those who say that what is most important is to have access to the truth. The cooperation of Iraq is fundamental in this regard. The Council shall give UNSCOM and Ambassador Butler all the latitude he deems necessary, in accordance with the resolutions of the Council concerning the work of the Special Commission, to establish the most adequate means to achieve its goals.

For these reasons, the draft resolution before us is, in our view, the most appropriate response of the Council in the present circumstances. It sends a clear message to Iraq: Let UNSCOM proceed with its task. Let it find the truth. Let the Commission accomplish its mission. Cooperate fully with it so that sanctions may finally be lifted.

This is why we have co-sponsored this draft resolution.

Mr. Dahlgren (Sweden): The mandate of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was given by the Security Council in order to ensure that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are eliminated so as to safeguard peace and security. Iraq must cooperate fully with the Special Commission. The Security Council has determined that Iraq must allow the Special Commission immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access in Iraq.

Iraq has flagrantly and repeatedly violated its obligations under relevant resolutions. Such violations are unacceptable and warrant a firm response from the Security Council. The draft resolution before us is a firm and adequate response. The measures will target only those individuals preventing UNSCOM from having access to sites it wishes to inspect or from conducting interviews in order to fulfil its task. Innocent Iraqi civilians will not be affected.

Full cooperation with the Special Commission and implementation of the relevant resolutions is the only way forward in order for the sanctions to be lifted. The Government of Iraq carries a heavy responsibility towards its own population if it continues to defy and further delay the completion of the mandate of the Special Commission.

Sweden supports the draft resolution before us. Its adoption by the Security Council will send a message which should be clearly understood by the Government of Iraq.

Mr. Matuszewski (Poland): The Polish delegation cannot but express its concern at the additional incidents that have occurred since the adoption of resolution 1115 (1997), in which the Iraqi authorities effectively denied the Special Commission (UNSCOM) access to sites designated for inspection or otherwise interfered in its operations undertaken in accordance with its mandate. These incidents have not allowed the Special Commission to advise the Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with the obligations set out in resolution 1115 (1997).

The Iraqi actions reported by UNSCOM violate the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Under the provisions of those resolutions, Iraq is obliged, among other things, to allow the UNSCOM inspection teams immediate and unrestricted access to all sites they choose for inspection.

Let me repeat what my delegation has been declaring over and over again. We would welcome the speediest possible lifting of sanctions imposed on Iraq. This is why we attach importance to the arduous progress made by UNSCOM towards the elimination of Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass destruction. This is also why we believe that Iraq should be reminded that its cooperation with UNSCOM is one of the basic conditions which must be fulfilled for the process of lifting of sanctions to begin.

The draft resolution before us, based on the logic of resolution 1115 (1997), which was unanimously adopted by this Council in June, clearly conveys this message. It also sends an appropriately strong signal — necessarily stronger than the one contained in the June resolution — that the Security Council is committed to ensuring that the Special Commission completes its mandate.

The Polish delegation expresses its earnest hope that the draft resolution submitted to the Council, if adopted, will have its intended effect and that the Iraqi authorities will desist from actions which prevent the Commission from carrying out its responsibilities. We remain concerned that such actions can only contribute to a regrettable delay in the fulfilment of the UNSCOM mandate, with all its detrimental consequences to the Iraqi people.

For the reasons I have just stated, the Polish delegation has co-sponsored the draft resolution before the Council.

Mr. Rana (Kenya): I would like, first of all, to express the appreciation of the Kenyan delegation for the efforts made by the sponsors of today's draft resolution in an attempt to accommodate the views and comments of all delegations. The goal of the international community remains to ensure that the process of disarming Iraq continues unhindered until all threats that it poses or could pose in future are removed.

We believe that the reports of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provide a platform on which our message to Iraq — to fully comply with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and to cooperate with UNSCOM — should have been based. Such a message, uncompromised and unified, would have allowed the Council to speak with one voice, as requested by the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.

We were encouraged, for instance, that for the most part the reports of UNSCOM and the IAEA indicate that during the period under review, significant progress was on several fronts, and particularly in the missile and chemical weapons areas. We would like to see the cooperation between the Government of Iraq and UNSCOM, which made this progress possible, further enhanced to allow UNSCOM to carry out its mandate in full. We believe that sending a strong message while acknowledging progress made, however insignificant, are not mutually exclusive actions.

The UNSCOM report, on the one hand, points to some issues that justifiably need the attention of this Council. Chief among these is the biological weapons programme, in which there has been almost no progress recorded. The other important issue is, of course, that of the methods of work. Here, UNSCOM has experienced difficulties in both the disclosure and the verification phases. Incidents of the Iraq Government's denial of access to certain sites, as set out in annex I to the report (S/1997/774) before us, continue to concern us, and we strongly insist that all such hindrances be removed by the

Government, to enable UNSCOM to perform its functions. The report also states that, in the overall context of the Commission's work, inspections were conducted without let or hindrance.

The draft before us (S/1997/816) takes on board some of the issues we have referred to. However, it does not clearly portray the balance and tone of the reports in question, and it is for those reasons that my delegation will abstain in the voting.

Mr. Liu Jieyi (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation believes Iraq should implement the relevant resolutions of the Security Council in a comprehensive manner. Meanwhile, the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as the reasonable security concerns, of Iraq should also be respected. The agreement signed between the United Nations Special Commission and Iraq last year on the question of inspection should be implemented.

The report (S/1997/774) of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) shows that in the last six months UNSCOM has made a great deal of progress in the inspections it has carried out in relevant fields. All together, it has carried out over 800 inspections. In most cases, Iraq has cooperated with UNSCOM. The difficulty that has occurred in the course of inspection is something that we do not wish to see.

We have taken note of the fact that UNSCOM is to conduct consultations with Iraq on the problems that have occurred in the course of inspection. We hope that the two sides will, in a spirit of cooperation, solve the problems that have occurred in the course of inspection. We also believe that to solve the problems that have followed the Gulf War is in the fundamental interests of Iraq and other countries of the region.

The Chinese delegation is never in favour of imposing sanctions against any State indiscriminately; nor is it in favour of using sanctions as a threat. Experience shows that doing so can only run counter to our objectives. Nor will it contribute to a proper settlement of the problems. We believe that, in order to solve problems, our priority now is to enhance the cooperation between Iraq and UNSCOM, rather than further complicating the matter, thus making it more difficult to solve.

We believe the current draft resolution is not conducive to the settlement of the problems concerned. In the course of consultations, quite a number of delegations proposed amendments. Regrettably, however, those amendments were not accepted.

In the light of the above, the Chinese delegation will have to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution.

Mr. Owada (Japan): On 21 June this year the Security Council adopted resolution 1115 (1997), in the face of Iraq's non-cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), condemning the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by the Commission. Specifically, the resolution expressed in paragraph 6 the firm intention of the Security Council — unless the Special Commission advised the Council that Iraq was in substantial compliance with the provisions of that resolution — to impose additional measures on those categories of Iraqi officials responsible for the non-compliance.

Regrettably, the latest report submitted by Ambassador Richard Butler, Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, makes it clear that there has been a continued series of Iraqi non-cooperation in this respect, representing attempts on the part of the Iraqi authorities not to comply with the provisions of resolution 1115 (1997) to allow UNSCOM the rights of inspection under the mandate of the Council.

While my delegation takes note of the progress achieved by the Special Commission — as set out in the latest report of the Executive Chairman (S/1997/774) — towards the elimination of Iraq's programme of weapons of mass destruction, it is most important that the Security Council make its determination abundantly clear to ensure full cooperation by Iraq with all its obligations under all previous relevant resolutions. The Council should insist upon its demand that Iraq allow the Special Commission immediate, unconditional, unrestricted access to any site which the Commission wishes to inspect.

This issue should not be looked at as a mere technicality of violations of the sanctions regime against Iraq. As my delegation stated at the time of the adoption of resolution 1115 (1997) on 21 June, what is at issue is the most serious question of how to prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction, an issue of the utmost concern to all of us in the Security Council involved in the problem of peace and stability in the region.

It is important for the international community, through the decision of the Security Council, to

demonstrate its position of principle on this situation. With this point in mind, my delegation, together with other like-minded delegations, has actively participated in our efforts to produce a draft resolution that reflects this common position of the international community. Our efforts have been directed to produce a draft resolution which could command the unified position of the Security Council.

With all the efforts exerted in the Council in good faith, however, there is a limit beyond which we cannot go in deference to the points of principle involved. Simply to repeat condemnations which have been issued in the past for dealing with past incidents will, in the view of my delegation, not be sufficient in the light of the gravity of the situation. An approach building upon and following upon what the Council agreed in resolution 1115 (1997) is needed, so that the Council may bring about the compliance of Iraq with its obligations.

Based on this approach, Japan is in support of the direction in which the Security Council will now be moving in adopting this draft resolution. In particular, my delegation notes that paragraphs 6 and 7 of the draft resolution are essential elements which seek to bring Iraq to resuming full cooperation with UNSCOM as soon as possible. It is our sincere hope that Iraq will review its position and cooperate unconditionally with UNSCOM. My delegation understands the purport of these paragraphs to be requiring Iraq to cooperate fully with UNSCOM, in form as well as in substance, and to give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to its officials and other persons under its authority for interviews, so that UNSCOM can exercise all its rights as an essential precondition for discharging its mandate.

In the view of my delegation, this draft resolution is an essential response needed in order for the Council to maintain its authority and to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is for this reason that Japan is co-sponsoring this draft resolution.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): First of all, we would like to reaffirm our consistent commitment to the need for Iraq to comply fully with the obligations following from the relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as our support for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

Just recently, the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) produced voluminous comprehensive reports on the significant work done in filling in blank spaces in the Iraqi disarmament dossier, reports that have been carefully studied by the Security Council members.

The Special Commission's report notes "significant" and "important" progress, particularly in the missile and chemical areas. An almost complete accounting of proscribed missiles has been given. All facilities and components for chemical-weapons manufacturing have been eliminated. In doing so, Iraq has displayed the necessary degree of cooperation and willingness.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report has a positive tone. Numerous IAEA inspection teams have confirmed the absence in Iraq of proscribed activity relating to nuclear weapons, while dual-purpose facilities and equipment are being reliably monitored.

It cannot yet be stated, however, that Iraq has accounted for all the weapons, components and capabilities proscribed by section C of resolution 687 (1991). In particular, a number of questions remain to be clarified in the biological sphere. There are certain deficiencies in Iraq's compliance with its obligations as regards cooperation with the Special Commission in the conduct of inspections. Still, isolated incidents concerning inspections that have occurred in the last few months cannot, we are convinced, justify the immediate adoption of additional sanctions against Iraq, as provided for in resolution 1115 (1997). But the Russian delegation does believe that the problems remaining in relations between UNSCOM and Baghdad deserve serious attention on the part of the Security Council and must be rapidly resolved, *inter alia* within the framework of the consultations between the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and Baghdad scheduled for this purpose.

Bearing all this in mind, we took a very active part in the preparation of the Security Council draft resolution, suggesting an objective and comprehensive response to the reports by the Special Committee and the IAEA.

As prepared by a group of sponsor States, the draft resolution before us for consideration today takes into account a number of observations made by my delegation, as well as by other Security Council members. In particular, it notes the Special Committee's progress towards eliminating the Iraqi programme for the production of weapons of mass destruction, and the question of introducing sanctions is deferred.

However, there is an obvious lack of balance in this draft. Ignored in it are various substantial elements of the

fulfilment by Iraq of relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991). For example, we cannot understand why the draft resolution contains no mention of the IAEA report, which notes significant progress in the nuclear sphere, an area in which the Iraqi dossier can be viewed as closed. The sponsors' categorical refusal to refer to the IAEA report in the draft resolution raises most serious questions and is unacceptable to us.

There is an attempt in the draft resolution to revise the provision in resolution 1115 (1997) on the need for "substantial compliance" by Iraq with UNSCOM's requirements for access for inspection purposes. Since resolution 1115 (1997) continues in effect, the use of new wording in the form proposed by the sponsors of the draft resolution will confuse the criteria for Iraqi compliance with the Council resolutions.

A substantive problem arises in regard to operative paragraph 7, which was added by the sponsors just yesterday. The proposed new concept of a black list is faulty from both logical and legal standpoints, and therefore cannot be acceptable. Lists of persons subject to sanctions should not be drawn up when the Council has not yet decided whether sanctions will be imposed or not. Though there are people who believe that the Security Council is its own master, and has the right power to set whatever legal standards it wishes, we are convinced that when drafting documents the Council must be governed by the universally recognized norms of international law.

In order to seek mutually acceptable solutions, the Russian delegation cooperated in a constructive manner with the sponsors throughout the course of the drafting of this resolution. We were prepared to continue working on the draft in order to make it more balanced and acceptable to all members of the Security Council, since we also believe it important for the Council to speak with one voice. As it turned out, unfortunately, the sponsors, of the draft resolution were not ready to do further work on it.

Taking all the afore-mentioned factors into account, the Russian delegation will be forced to abstain during the vote.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/1997/816.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Chile, Costa Rica, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Against:

None

Abstaining:

China, Egypt, France, Kenya, Russian Federation

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The result of the voting is as follows: 10 votes in favour, none against and 5 abstentions. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 1134 (1997).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Dejammet (France) (*interpretation from French*): Like all the members of the Security Council we are motivated by the desire to see Iraq discharge its obligations in regard to the resolutions of the Security Council and, with this end in mind, by the wish to strengthen our support for the work of the Special Commission, and to make sure that the cooperation between the Special Commission and Iraq produces the anticipated results as soon as possible.

We based our judgement on the report submitted to us by the Special Commission, a report in which many of us found sections that were — happily and finally — positive. We also noted the recommendations of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, which did not contain any request for the immediate imposition of additional sanctions.

We based the abstention which we just exercised on a consideration of the merits of the text of the resolution, but also in the light of a very strong principle, which was expressed with great conviction by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission. This principle highlights the advantage, as far as possible, of seeking unity within the Council so as to underline the authority of the activities entrusted to the Special Commission by the Council. And it is this unity — which for some years now the Council has shown in its actions in regard to important texts pertaining to Iraq — that, we feel, has contributed to the achievement of the significant progress noted in the last report.

We agree that the text we have just voted on respects a fundamental principle: the sovereignty of the Council in its decision-making process. We deem it positive that those Council members who took part in the discussion of the text were able to demonstrate their unanimous agreement with that basic truth. However, bearing in mind the idea of proportionality referred to earlier, we had wanted the wording of the text to be such that it would not give rise to any hasty or erroneous interpretations, such as the belief that an additional sanctions process had already been set in motion — contrary, I repeat, to the appeal that we felt was contained in the report of the Special Commission.

We regret that the wording of certain paragraphs, which could have been improved upon, might lead some to believe that additional sanctions already existed. For that reason, we regret that the technical proposals that could have done away with these ambiguities were not approved.

The resolution's preamble acknowledges that progress has been achieved. That is good and shows that efforts were made by all Council members to reflect the conclusions reached by the Commission. But in this same vein, because progress was made, we think that the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission should have received some encouragement, however modest, to continue with his efforts and enhance further the effectiveness of the Special Commission's cooperation with the Iraqi authorities. We regret that that appeal was not heeded.

We had hoped also that the Council, in the future exercise of its prerogatives, would continue to use very precise wording in its work in order to avoid situations in which people who are not directly responsible for the problems encountered might find themselves facing sanctions. We deem it unfortunate that this suggestion was not taken into account. We also regret that a number of suggestions — which in our view would have helped improve the text by making it more strict and precise — were not acted on, because we believe that that final effort, which would not have taken much time, would probably have enabled us to get closer to the very desirable objective to which I referred earlier: unity within the Council. We could have demonstrated the Council's solidarity with the Special Commission and thus also strengthened the Commission's work in order to achieve all of the objectives of resolution 687 (1991).

It is in the light of these considerations that we were compelled to abstain in the voting.

Mr. Richardson (United States of America): Today, the Security Council agreed to specific travel restrictions on those categories of Iraqi officials responsible for obstructing the work of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). The Council declared its intention to impose such sanctions the next time Iraq violates the terms of Security Council resolution 1115 (1997), and the Council will begin from today the process of drawing up a list of those officials whose travel is to be prevented in such an eventuality.

It is amazing to me that, after six and a half years, this body still must consider new approaches to convince Iraq to comply with its international obligations. Only one party is responsible for this very sad state of affairs: the Baghdad regime.

Six and a half years after the liberation of Kuwait, Iraq still refuses to meet its most basic obligations, such as allowing UNSCOM inspectors to carry out their Security Council mandate without obstruction or harassment. Resolution 1115 (1997) reminded Baghdad — yet again — of its clear obligations in this area, and put it on notice that the Security Council would not tolerate continued Iraqi refusal to give UNSCOM the access necessary to ensure that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction no longer menace the region.

Apparently, this strong warning was not enough. UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler's report to the Security Council records a litany of Iraqi harassment, obfuscation, obstruction and deception — all taking place after resolution 1115 (1997) was adopted. For example, Iraqi officials destroyed documents in front of UNSCOM inspectors; Iraqi officials blocked access to sites, documents, and individuals; Iraqi officials — at the highest levels — lied and concealed information about key programmes, even when confronted with known facts by UNSCOM; Iraqi officials physically detained an UNSCOM chief aerial inspector and photographer; and Iraqi officials interfered with UNSCOM helicopter operations, endangering pilots and passengers.

In addition, the Deputy Prime Minister, in front of the Executive Chairman himself, told Iraqi officials under his authority not to answer questions posed by UNSCOM. And, perhaps most disturbing, the Iraqi Permanent Representative to New York privately and publicly threatened that Iraq will cease cooperation with UNSCOM and the Security Council if the Council imposes new sanctions on Iraq. If carried out, this threat

would represent a material breach of Iraq's obligations and demand a strong response.

How did Iraq explain these egregious acts? Iraq first attacked the credibility of the Special Commission and questioned its judgement. When this did not work, Iraq resorted to the time-honoured tactics of bullying, burning and blackmailing.

UNSCOM operates as an arm of the Security Council and gets its mandate solely from Security Council resolutions. When Baghdad challenges UNSCOM, it challenges the Council, and the Council has again made clear that it will brook no such challenges. If, after six and a half years, Iraq still does not understand this basic fact, then we must once again consider new mechanisms to make it understand.

Some here have suggested that the Security Council ought to reward Iraq because it is, in their view, cooperating with UNSCOM to a greater degree now than it has in the past. They point out that since there were "only" six blockages out of 670 inspections, Iraq is substantially complying with resolution 1115 (1997).

Using that logic, if I walked into a bank 670 times and robbed it only six times, I would therefore be a "substantially law-abiding" citizen. Compliance with international obligations is not a voluntary act. Cooperation is not a matter of degree. Either Iraq is in compliance with its obligations or it is in breach of those obligations.

The Security Council has not asked UNSCOM to determine how many or what kind of programmes of weapons of mass destruction it is acceptable for Iraq to maintain, but rather to verify that all of Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass destruction have been destroyed. UNSCOM cannot complete this task, frankly, because Iraq will not cooperate.

Let us take a look at Iraq's so-called cooperation over the past six months. Iraq is claiming that its "cooperation" allowed UNSCOM to account for most of the Scud missile engines imported into Iraq. But in fact, Iraq refused to let UNSCOM remove those engines from Iraq for analysis for four months last year. And Iraq still has not explained why many of those engines were apparently stripped of key components before they were destroyed: the same parts critical to the development of an indigenous missile production programme.

UNSCOM is right to insist that Iraq account for these and other components and clarify the status of Iraq's indigenous Scud manufacturing capability. Until Iraq provides this information, there is no way to determine with any degree of confidence whether Iraq still has the capacity to construct and deploy prohibited missiles.

Iraq also wants the Council to believe that it has cooperated with UNSCOM with regard to chemical weapons. However, as late as September, Iraq was still lying directly to UNSCOM about its production of VX. Only when presented with absolutely incontrovertible evidence did Iraq "cooperate" by admitting that it had lied in the past. Again, this is too little, too late.

As to biological weapons, the words of the report of the Secretary-General speak for themselves:

> "This is an area that is unredeemed by progress or any approximation of the known facts of Iraq's programme". [S/1997/774, para. 125]

Some of my colleagues have tried to draw attention to the report of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, on Iraq's nuclear programme as an example of Iraqi cooperation. However, even in this area it is clear that Iraq has not answered all the relevant questions necessary to have a full accounting of its programmes. The books cannot be closed. Furthermore, we now know, thanks to the efforts of Mr. Blix and his staff, that Iraq lied and concealed an active weaponization programme for years in direct defiance of its commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its commitments to the IAEA. Iraq has lied about its programmes for too long and too recently for us to settle for anything less than absolute certainty that Iraq's nuclear ambitions have been completely neutralized.

When accounting for nuclear weapons, close is not good enough. If you fail to account for just one nuclear device, that could mean the destruction of an entire city.

Baghdad has a clear and simple choice. It can comply with its obligations, thus opening the way to lifting sanctions, or it can continue along the path of non-compliance. It cannot do both.

At this point, I would like to commend the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Mr. Butler, for the fine work he and his staff have done in the short time he

has been in his position. Clearly, Mr. Butler has the courage, stamina and dedication necessary to perform his extremely difficult job. The international community owes Mr. Butler and his staff their gratitude.

UNSCOM and the Council have the right and the obligation to hold Iraq strictly accountable for every aspect of all its programmes of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq cannot pick and choose which questions it wishes to answer.

We on the Council must do everything we can to give Ambassador Butler the tools and the support he needs to do his job as efficiently and as thoroughly as possible. This resolution, we believe, helps to accomplish that objective. This resolution represents a strong but measured response of the Security Council to the continued failure of the Iraqi Government to cooperate with the Special Commission.

Since nothing in Iraqi behaviour merits the lifting of the suspension of the sanctions review, this resolution extends the suspension. No one even suggests that after six and a half years Iraqi performance comes close to compliance. Our resolution does not impose sanctions now, but it does start the process by beginning the compilation of names, so if sanctions are imposed there will be no administrative delay. It makes very clear to the Iraqi authorities that the next time they try to block UNSCOM's work the Council will impose sanctions against those individuals responsible for Iraqi failure to cooperate with UNSCOM.

We are not proposing broad-based sanctions that may cause hardship for the Iraqi people. Our goal remains to help the people of Iraq. But our goal must also always be to help protect all the peoples of the region, and especially the people of Kuwait, who have suffered the most from Iraqi aggression, whose properties and archives were stolen during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and whose families still suffer the daily anguish of not knowing what has become of their loved ones still missing in action or taken prisoner of war. We must not, and will not, forget them, and we call upon Iraq to comply with the Council resolutions which deal with these issues.

This resolution addresses the specific issues of Iraqi non-cooperation with UNSCOM and Iraqi obstruction of UNSCOM's work. But for Iraq to rejoin the international family of respectable nations, it must begin by demonstrating its peaceful intentions and by fully complying with all relevant resolutions of the Council.

It was our hope that all members of the Council would have supported this resolution. The sponsors made tremendous efforts to obtain the support of all Council members. Some members have chosen not to support this resolution. We regret their decision. But there have been other resolutions on Iraq that were not unanimous. Those resolutions all carry the full weight of international law, and so will this one.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.

United Nations

S/PV.3827

Security Council

Fifty-second Year

Provisional

3827th Meeting

Wednesday, 29 October 1997, 12.20 p.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Somavía	(Chile)
Members:	China	Mr. Liu Jieyi
	Costa Rica	Mr. Saenz Biolley
	Egypt	Mr. Awaad
	France	Mr. Thiebaud
	Guinea-Bissau	Mr. Da Rosa
	Japan	Mr. Owada
	Kenya	Mr. Rana
	Poland	Mr. Wlosowicz
	Portugal	Mr. Monteiro
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Park
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Sweden	Mr. Salander
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Richmond
	United States of America	Mr. Burleigh

Agenda

The situation in Angola

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (S/1997/807)

97-86347 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 12.20 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Angola

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (S/1997/807)

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Angola and Brazil, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Van Dunem "Mbinda" (Angola) took a seat at the Council table; Mr. Amorim (Brazil) took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, document S/1997/807. Members also have before them document S/1997/823, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations.

The first speaker is the representative of Angola, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. Van Dunem "Mbinda" (Angola): Let me begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the current month. Let me also congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Bill Richardson, for the way in which he conducted the proceedings of this Council during his mandate.

The past 30 days have been a time of high expectations among the members of the Security Council and the international community at large, waiting to see whether the decision and the deadline set by the Security Council in its resolutions 1127 (1997) and 1130 (1997) would be fully complied with, or if this Council would again and for the second time be forced to apply new sanctions against UNITA.

As the facts on the ground show and the Secretary-General's report clearly demonstrates, UNITA provided no sign of cooperation or of good faith and political will. It has yet to fulfil three crucial obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, namely, the handover to the Government of all localities under its control, the demilitarization of its remaining troops and the cessation of its hostile anti-Government propaganda.

As of today, no substantial progress has been made in the demilitarization of its military wing. The figures advanced by that organization with regard to its current military strength are false, fabricated and therefore totally unacceptable. The truth is that UNITA still maintains about 35,000 heavily armed men, equipped with sophisticated artillery pieces and other war *matériel*.

I must underline that unless these forces are completely disbanded, no peace will be achieved in Angola, because they are the main source of tensions and insecurity.

As to the process of the normalization of State administration, despite the progress made, we find ourselves far from its conclusion. The process is experiencing delays caused by obstacles systematically raised by UNITA. It remains unthinkable for UNITA to hand over Bailundo and Andulo to Government control. With regard to UNITA's radio station, though steps were taken towards transforming it into a nonpartisan station, very little progress was made. UNITA's anti-Government propaganda continues, now based mainly in UNITA's so-called representations in some foreign countries.

One can see easily that UNITA's leadership has completely disregarded the urging of this Council and blatantly violated its resolutions 1127 (1997) and 1130 (1997). All the international appeals for it to implement its share of the Lusaka Protocol, which is the only basis for peace, stability and development in Angola, have fallen on deaf ears.

Instead, UNITA, as in the past, has systematically resorted to manoeuvres aimed at impressing the members of the Security Council and the international community, with a view to avoiding the entry into force of sanctions as set out in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 1127 (1997).

The international community, and this Council in particular, cannot and should not let itself be misled by an organization which so far has given no proof of abandoning its quest to take power by force. If this Council fails to use the means at its disposal to impede UNITA from carrying out its intentions, a new outburst of violence will be witnessed in Angola, with serious consequences for peace and stability throughout the entire central and southern African region.

The imposition of strong international restrictive measures against UNITA remains the only alternative sure to dissuade that organization's leadership from war and urge it to take the path of peace and democracy.

I would like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to paragraph 7 of resolution 1127 (1997), which states:

> "the provisions of paragraph 4 above shall come into force ...unless the Security Council decides, on the basis of a report by the Secretary-General, that UNITA has taken concrete and irreversible steps to comply with all the obligations".

Today, when a new deadline for UNITA to fulfil its obligations has come to an end, what we can conclude is that UNITA has not taken the necessary steps to comply with all the obligations set out in resolution 1127 (1997). Therefore, we cannot expect less than immediate application of the measures set forth in paragraph 4 of resolution 1127 (1997), for the good of the people of Angola and to ensure the Council's moral authority.

The draft resolution to be adopted today goes in that direction and is an expression of the Council's determination to bring peace to Angola. We look forward to the UNITA leadership's understanding this strong message from the international community and speeding up the conclusion of the peace process.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Angola for his kind words addressed to me and last month's President.

The next speaker is the representative of Brazil. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Amorim (Brazil): First of all, let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. Under your able and wise guidance the work of the Security Council has been conducted in a highly effective way. I would also take this opportunity to express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Bill Richardson.

With regard to recent developments in Angola, we would like to pay tribute to the key role played by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Maître Blondin Beye, and by the troika of observer States.

Regrettably, in the last couple of months, as stated by the Secretary-General in his report (S/1997/807), there has been no significant progress in the peace process in Angola. The implementation of the plan extending the State administration throughout the country has been subject to unjustifiable delays. In spite of steps taken towards the establishment of Radio Despertar, a new and legal FM station, Radio Vorgan continues to broadcast. The process of demilitarization, registration and disarmament of the so-called residual UNITA personnel has not shown a meaningful advance.

We urge UNITA to relinquish all personnel and equipment in its possession to the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) as soon as possible, in fulfilment of its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol. All parties involved should exercise restraint for this process to be undertaken peacefully.

Brazil understands that sanctions must be regarded as an instrument of last resort. We have insisted that sanctions should not be seen as an end in themselves. They must be reserved for situations of extreme gravity, especially because they can produce negative effects on innocent populations and neighbouring countries.

In the case of Angola, however, we are convinced that the Security Council is on the correct path in adopting a draft resolution that triggers sanctions specifically targeted against the reluctant party, UNITA. The situation has reached a point at which the message that the international community will no longer tolerate failure to abide by agreed commitments must get through.

The coming month will bring the third anniversary of the Lusaka Protocol. Let us hope that the measures taken today will have the effect of demonstrating that the only viable options in Angola are peace and reconciliation.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Brazil for his kind words addressed to me and to the former President.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation)(*interpretation from Russian*): The Russian Federation, which is a member of the troika of observer States of the Angolan peace process and a troop-contributor to the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), is greatly interested in the successful completion of the peace process and a speedy restoration of lasting peace and national reconciliation in Angola.

The achievement of that objective is of great significance, both for Angola itself and for the strengthening of stability in the entire region. We are deeply concerned over the fact that in recent months the course of the peace process has been blocked. There is no doubt that the motives for that are exclusively political, namely, the efforts of the UNITA leadership to delay on any pretext implementation of the inter-Angolan agreements entered into and to depart from implementation of the commitments set out in the Lusaka Protocol.

The UNITA leadership has openly disregarded the requirements of resolutions 1127 (1997) and 1130 (1997) and has not properly used the two goodwill pauses offered it by the international community. As a result, today at midnight the sanctions against UNITA provided for in resolution 1127 (1997) will enter into effect. We should like to believe that this time the UNITA leadership will draw the correct conclusions and will immediately and fully comply with its commitments, thereby sparing the Security Council the task of further increasing the sanctions.

Given the present critical situation in the Angolan peace process, the second element of the draft resolution — the three-month extension of the mandate of MONUA and the postponement of the withdrawal of United Nations military formed units — is of great significance. The draft resolution offers wide-ranging possibilities for effective monitoring of the peace process and for adapting Security Council action in the light of further developments.

The coming months will be decisive for the peace process as a whole, and we are pleased that the draft resolution clearly demands that the Government of Angola and UNITA complete fully and without further delay the remaining aspects of the peace process, cooperate fully with MONUA and refrain from any action which might further complicate the peace process.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Russian delegation, together with other members of the Council, will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. Richmond (United Kingdom): We postponed sanctions at the end of September because UNITA promised to finish its remaining tasks in the Angolan peace process. At the time, UNITA appeared to be making some welcome progress. Given the subsequent lack of progress, we can only conclude that those positive developments were concessions by UNITA simply to prevent the implementation of sanctions. During October, UNITA continued to fail conspicuously to meet its remaining obligations, despite being urged repeatedly to do so. In effect, UNITA broke its promises.

Once again, as we consider the prospect of sanctions, UNITA is making welcome steps in the right direction. But they are not enough. The Security Council should not allow itself to be swayed again by last-minute gestures.

We believe that, unfortunately, the time has come to apply the pressure on UNITA envisaged in resolution 1127 (1997). We do this not to punish UNITA, but to encourage it to keep its promises.

We hope that UNITA will realize that delay does not pay and that it will quickly implement its remaining obligations in good faith. The Council is ready to lift these measures as soon as UNITA has done so.

But first we need substantial action from UNITA, particularly on the extension of State administration, demilitarization and the transformation of Radio Vorgan. We do not accept that UNITA has no more troops to

demobilize. UNITA must declare all of its remaining troops so that they can be properly demobilized.

The Government of Angola also has its responsibilities. It must notify the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) of its force movements and refrain from aggressive troop movements or other military acts. We also share the Secretary-General's concern at Angola's intervention in Congo (Brazzaville). Angolan forces should be withdrawn immediately.

If the peace process is to move forward, it is essential that greater trust be developed between the two sides. In this context, we welcome the announcement that a meeting will take place between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi in Angola in November.

The Secretary-General is right to be concerned at the current critical stage of the peace process. We agree with him that the continuing presence of MONUA military units can help to maintain stability. We support his recommendations that the withdrawal of troops should be further postponed and that the mandate of MONUA should be extended to 31 January 1998.

We will therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. Awaad (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The consideration of the situation in Angola by the Security Council today once again indicates that the peace process has entered a delicate stage that endangers the achievements of the past two years, due to UNITA's dragging its feet in the implementation of its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol — in particular, to demilitarize and enable the Angolan Government to restore State administration throughout Angolan territory; to transform Radio Vorgan into a neutral broadcaster; and to genuinely transform UNITA itself in a meaningful way into a political party. These requirements have not been met; there has been meagre progress towards meeting them. The international community expects UNITA to genuinely and unconditionally implement these basic obligations. The adoption by the Council of resolutions 1127 (1997) and 1130 (1997) during the past two months reflects the great importance the international community attaches to UNITA's respect for its obligations and to the commencement of a new era of peace in Angola.

The delegation of Egypt has carefully considered the Secretary-General's report on the situation in Angola. We would like to express our appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, Maître Blondin Beye, and the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), particularly since they are all accomplishing their tasks efficiently under very difficult conditions, which are being aggravated by the non-cooperation of one party or another in a comprehensive manner with the international mission. On the other hand, we also regret that reports continue to indicate that aircraft are still landing in airports under UNITA control and that UNITA has resumed mining the main roads. These practices reaffirm that UNITA is trying to project its image as a State within the State. This is totally unacceptable in the wake of the establishment of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, and it also raises concerns with regard to the possible involvement of outside parties in the Angolan crisis. Breaking the present stalemate in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol is contingent upon UNITA's demonstrating a strong political will to abandon the option of war and to cease all practices that slow down implementation of the peace agreement. We are also convinced that this cannot be achieved without the international community, particularly the Security Council and the troika States, applying appropriate pressures on the UNITA leadership to give effect to these objectives.

In Angola the United Nations has achieved tangible successes that cannot be minimized. Foremost of these is the stemming of the bloodshed among Angolans and marshalling the UNITA forces in camps. I would like to also mention the United Nations success in demining and repairing bridges and roads and other elements of the country's infrastructure. These are very important achievements to which tribute should be paid and which should not be thrown to the wind or jeopardized today.

During the adoption of resolution 1130 (1997) the delegation of Egypt expressed the hope that UNITA would use the period which ended on 30 September to respond to the will of the international community represented in Security Council resolutions. We also expected UNITA to fulfil its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol in a manner that would give the Council the opportunity to reconsider the measures contained in that resolution before they were applied. Yet this, regrettably, has not happened. And in spite of our objection in principle to the application of sanctions, the current circumstances and the situation in Angola, particularly the support by the Angola Government itself for the imposition of these sanctions, today prompts us to support the implementation of these measures.

The delegation of Egypt would like to reaffirm its full support for the recommendations of the Secretary-General made in his report with regard to the size of the MONUA mission, in particular the postponement of the withdrawal of the military units and the linkage between their withdrawal and the full implementation of the military aspects of the Lusaka Protocol, since it is absolutely necessary to guarantee the security of the Mission, as well as of the United Nations personnel and other international personnel. We also reaffirm the importance of holding a meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi in Angola, at the earliest possible moment, in order to get rid of the current stalemate.

The delegation of Egypt supports the draft resolution and will vote in favour of it.

Mr. Park (Republic of Korea): The Republic of Korea is gravely concerned about the slow progress in the Angolan peace process. Of particular concern to us is the stalling of the demilitarization of UNITA, owing to its failure to provide additional information, and the disappointingly slow pace of the extension of state administration, including Mr. Savimbi's position that Andulo and Bailundo will be turned over to the Angolan Government only after his return to Luanda. What is more regrettable is that UNITA's cooperation has not been forthcoming after the postponement of sanctions late last month. Now that UNITA has not taken the steps necessary to comply fully with resolution 1127 (1997), we believe that it is incumbent upon the Council to show its resoluteness by allowing no further postponement of the sanctions envisaged in the resolution.

We once again draw the UNITA leadership's attention to the fact that the measures set forth in resolution 1127 (1997) are meant not to punish UNITA, but to lead it to cooperation. We strongly hope that it will disarm and demobilize all its personnel, give up its means of hostile propaganda and cooperate in the normalization of State administration without any further delay. We stress once again, in this regard, the importance of a meeting on Angolan territory between the President of Angola and the leader of UNITA, which is long overdue, despite the repeated calls by the international community for its convening.

We would also like to express our concern about the tension created by the movement of Government troops, which is affecting negatively not only the Angolan peace process, but also peace and security in the whole region. We are especially concerned about the newly emerging pattern of cross-border interventions in the region, in clear violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We therefore strongly support the statement that the President of the Council will make at the end of this meeting, calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from the Republic of the Congo. We are also concerned about the acts of banditry in areas where the Angolan Government is in control and about the restriction of free circulation of people and goods, in particular the restrictions imposed on the movement of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) and international personnel engaged in humanitarian activities. We urge the Angolan Government to take steps to address these serious problems and to extend full cooperation to the peace process.

In these circumstances, we believe that the continued international presence in Angola is needed and support the Secretary-General's proposal to extend the mandate of MONUA until the end of January 1998 and to postpone, accordingly, the drawdown of its military component. We will therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution before the Council.

We renew our appreciation and support of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, Maître Beye, and the personnel of MONUA, as well as the troika of observer countries, for their dedicated efforts. We trust that they will continue to assist the parties in moving towards the successful conclusion of the peace process.

Mr. Salander (Sweden): Despite all efforts, the Angolan peace process has made no significant progress in recent months. Both parties must show their commitment to implementing the Lusaka Protocol fully and without reservation. However, the main responsibility for delaying the peace process lies with UNITA.

In resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August 1997, the Council sent a clear message to UNITA that the international community would no longer tolerate its obstructions. The Council decided to impose additional measures unless the UNITA leadership took concrete and irreversible steps to comply with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. Last month, the Council afforded the UNITA leadership additional time to comply with the Lusaka Protocol. In spite of this, UNITA has still not fulfilled its obligations. The Security Council must therefore act accordingly.

Decisions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter are necessary in serious circumstances. Unfortunately, this is once again the case in Angola. The measures which will come into effect today are specifically aimed at the UNITA leadership. They will not negatively affect the Angolan people. Exemptions are made for humanitarian purposes. Furthermore, the conditions for lifting the sanctions are made clear. The Sanctions Committee for Angola needs to ensure that the sanctions regime is implemented correctly, with the cooperation of all States Members of the United Nations.

The draft resolution leaves no doubt about the firm determination of the Security Council to help to bring lasting peace to Angola. The sanctions are not an end in themselves, but a means to convince the UNITA leadership that there is no alternative but to comply with the Lusaka Protocol.

The United Nations continues to play a vital role in the peace process in Angola. Sweden fully supports today's decision to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) for a further three months. Given the tense security situation in Angola, it remains important that the drawdown of the military component of the mission be carried out taking into account developments on the ground. The Mission must be able to fulfil its mandate without harassment or obstruction.

Vital military elements of the peace process still remain to be fulfilled. We hope that the next few months will also, however, show progress in the implementation of MONUA's crucial civilian mandate, not least in the human rights and political field. In the area of human rights, we look in particular to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to assist MONUA in strengthening the mission's human rights component and in the fulfilment of its human rights mandate. We agree with the Secretary-General about the essential role of United Nations civilian police in the peace process, especially during the extension of state administration.

Sweden will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us. Sweden would also like to take this opportunity to urge both parties to ensure that all Angolan forces are immediately withdrawn from the Republic of the Congo. This is a necessary step in order to create relations of mutual trust and confidence in the region, as well as in Angola itself. We urge the Government to notify MONUA of any troop movements, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol.

Sweden would like to express its appreciation for the continuous efforts carried out by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, Maître Blondin Beye, the three observer States — Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States — as well as to the personnel of MONUA. These efforts remain essential for the advancement of the peace process and the achievement of national reconciliation.

Mr. Owada (Japan): In its resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August, the Security Council made it clear that the serious difficulties in the peace process are mainly the result of delays by UNITA in the implementation of its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. Despite repeated calls by the Security Council, UNITA had been failing to fulfil its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. Therefore, the Council decided in that resolution that all States should take the necessary measures specified therein, unless UNITA took concrete and irreversible steps to comply with all its obligations within a one-month period.

The measures which UNITA did take or promised to take towards the end of September, belated and insufficient though they were, nevertheless provided reason to hope that it would at last live up to its obligations in the peace process. In the light of these developments, the Council thus decided by resolution 1130 (1997) that the coming into force of the measures specified in resolution 1127 (1997) should be postponed for another month.

Now it appears, however, that that hope has not been realized. UNITA has not responded to the call of the international community, offering only at the eleventh hour to take limited measures. This time, the Council has no choice but to apply the sanctions.

Japan attaches great importance to ensuring that these sanctions be effective. The cooperation of neighbouring States is essential in this regard. UNITA should be reminded that the Security Council is ready to review the measures it is now imposing or to consider additional measures, depending on the steps UNITA takes in the coming days to meet its obligations.

While UNITA has been the main focus of criticism for reneging on its commitments, it should also be noted that the Government of Angola is likewise called upon to meet its obligations in order to advance the peace process and to cooperate with MONUA. In addition, Japan joins others in urging both Angolan parties to agree on the date

and venue of the long-awaited meeting in Angola between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. This would contribute greatly to the achievement of lasting stability.

Also on this occasion, Japan wishes to express its grave concern regarding the presence of Angolan armed elements in the Republic of the Congo, as reported by the Secretariat. Japan joins in the call to be made by the President of the Security Council on all foreign forces to withdraw immediately from the Republic of the Congo.

My delegation is in agreement with the Secretary-General's assessment that the presence of MONUA continues to be essential at this critical stage in the peace process and that the security situation in Angola calls for the continued deployment of United Nations troops there. Japan therefore supports his recommendation to extend the mandate of MONUA for three months, until 31 January 1998, and to postpone the withdrawal of United Nations military armed units until the end of November.

For all these reasons, Japan will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us.

The international community will continue to monitor closely the actions of the Government of Angola and UNITA and to assist them in their efforts to fulfil their commitments to the peace process. Japan, for its part, will explore ways to offer possible support and assistance in these efforts, carefully weighing the developments in the country.

In closing, Sir, I should like once again, on behalf of my Government, to pay tribute to the Secretary-General, to his Special Representative, Maître Alioune Blondin Beye, to the personnel of MONUA and to the three observer States for their untiring efforts to promote peace and stability in Angola.

Mr. Monteiro (Portugal): Portugal fully supports the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), until 30 January 1998. It endorses the recommendation of the Secretary-General to postpone the withdrawal of the United Nations military component until the end of November, taking into account the situation on the ground.

The peace process in Angola has reached a mature phase, but it is clearly not yet irreversible. Indeed, we are in a process, but we have not yet achieved the peace. The draft resolution before us has been designed to work towards that goal, and we urge its full implementation.

We deeply regret that significant progress has not been made in the remaining key tasks of the peace process. The very slow pace of the demilitarization of UNITA and the slow-down of the extension of State administration into the areas controlled by UNITA following the adoption of resolution 1130 (1997), as reported by the Secretary-General, are of particular concern to Portugal.

The Security Council gave UNITA two grace periods — 60 days — in which it had the time and the opportunity to move positively and decisively towards fulfilling its obligations and the terms of the "Acordos de Paz", the Lusaka Protocol and the relevant resolutions of the Council.

In adopting resolution 1127 (1997), the Council sent a clear and unambiguous message to UNITA: take concrete and irreversible steps towards a successful conclusion of the peace process. Unfortunately, UNITA, despite some positive actions and promises, has not taken those concrete and irreversible steps, and the international community, through the Security Council, has to act accordingly.

We hope that UNITA will understand the message that is being sent by the Council. The measures that will go into force tomorrow are not an end in themselves. They are aimed at achieving the objectives shared by all those who wish to see peace take root in Angola; and, let me stress once more, these objectives were freely accepted by the signatories of the "Acordos de Paz" and the Lusaka Protocol.

The Council is clearly ready to review these measures in the light of meaningful and irreversible progress on the ground, but it is equally ready to consider additional measures, if needed.

We urge the Government of Angola and UNITA to reaffirm in practical and positive steps their commitment to national reconciliation and peace. The future of the Angolan people is at stake.

Mr. Sáenz Biolley (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): On behalf of my delegation, I would like to state that since the establishment of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation of Angola on 11 April 1997, the peace process in that country is irreversible, and both the Government of Angola and UNITA should fulfil the implementation of the remaining commitments under the "Acordos de Paz" and the Lusaka Protocol.

We have no doubt that the non-compliance with the commitments between the parties, as well as with the obligations imposed by the resolutions of the Security Council, cannot be tolerated, as the people of Angola deserve to live in peace and to enjoy prosperity.

Part A of resolution 1127 (1997) demanded that the Government of Angola, and particularly UNITA, comply fully and without further delay with the remaining aspects of the peace process. In particular, it called on UNITA to demilitarize all its forces, transform radio Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting facility and cooperate fully with the process of normalizing of State administration throughout the territory of Angola.

Part B, paragraph 4 of the same resolution imposed a set of measures on UNITA in order to encourage that group to cooperate even more with the peace process; those measures were to go into effect on 30 September 1997. However, given the cooperation shown by UNITA, the Council issued resolution 1130 (1997) on 29 September, by which it postponed the entry into force of those measures.

Regrettably, according to the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council UNITA has not fully complied with its obligations under resolution 1127 (1997). The measures set out in that resolution should therefore enter fully into force so as to speed up the peace process in Angola.

My delegation would like to express the hope that these measures should help persuade UNITA once and for all to fulfil each and every one of its obligations towards the people of Angola and the international community.

My delegation wishes to underscore the nature of the measures imposed on UNITA, as they are another example of the trend prevailing in the Council to impose sanctions aimed at leaders or elite groups of the parties to a conflict so as not to affect the humanitarian situation of the civilian population of a given country.

The conditions for the full demobilization and demilitarization of UNITA exist in Angola, as the representatives of that group hold posts in the Government structure, the army and the National Police. UNITA has no reason whatever to maintain an armed force or territory under its control. In this connection, UNITA should hand over the areas of Andulo and Bailundo in order to complete the extension of State administration to all Angolan territory.

Furthermore, Costa Rica confidently hopes that President Dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi will be able to meet soon on Angolan territory to negotiate the outstanding points with a view to comprehensive peace in their country.

My delegation believes that we cannot fail to mention, as other delegations have done, the reports on the presence of Angolan armed elements in the Republic of the Congo. These kinds of actions endanger the peace process — which has cost the people of Angola so dearly — as well as the stability of the region itself. They are also a violation of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We therefore join those who have condemned all foreign interference in the Republic of the Congo, and we urge foreign forces, including mercenaries, to withdraw immediately from that country.

I wish finally to express my country's appreciation to the civilian, military and police personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola for their outstanding efforts, to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Angola, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, and to the personnel of United Nations programmes and agencies in Angola. It goes without saying that we reiterate our appreciation also to the countries of the troika: Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Costa Rica supports the draft resolution before the Council today.

Mr. Thiebaud (France) (*interpretation from French*): The French delegation supports draft resolution S/1997/823, on which the Council will soon vote. The present status of the Angolan peace process justifies the Security Council following the recommendations of the Secretary-General on extending the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) and on postponing the withdrawal of United Nations military formed units.

Moreover, the behaviour of UNITA justifies the application with respect to that movement of the measures set out in resolution 1127 (1997) without further delay. UNITA has yet to fulfil its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol or to meet its obligations under Security Council resolutions. It therefore bears the main responsibility for the problems facing the peace process. The Security Council has demonstrated patience by waiting two months to implement the measures set out in resolution 1127 (1997). The implementation of those

measures must make UNITA understand that its only chance for the future lies in participation in the country's political life, with respect for all the commitments it has undertaken.

The Government of Angola, which can rely on the support of France in the task of national reconstruction, must heed the appeals of the members of the Security Council, with particular reference to cooperation with the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola.

Mr. Rana (Kenya): The Angolan peace process is at a critical and very sensitive stage where utmost cooperation is required in order for the parties to meet their obligations and to make irreversible progress. The international community has provided resources and manpower to facilitate the peace process in Angola. It is therefore disheartening that the parties, and in particular UNITA, have not taken full advantage of the resources made available to them in order successfully to complete the peace process.

Kenya will vote in favour of draft resolution S/1997/823. However, my delegation had hoped that by this time we would be talking of programmes and projects for the economic rehabilitation of Angola. Instead, we are discussing the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) and the imposition of sanctions. This situation is very disappointing considering that it could have been avoided altogether if the parties in Angola, and UNITA in particular, had fully and unconditionally complied with the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

We are equally disheartened by the fact that the two protagonists, President Dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, have not met despite the numerous calls by the international community for them to do so. Kenya believes that a meeting between these two leaders, even if symbolic, would have contributed to confidence-building, thereby moving the peace process forward. In this regard, we are encouraged by the information that the two leaders are planning to meet early next month. We hope that the meeting will lead to a quick resolution of the remaining issues in the peace process. In the meantime, we call upon UNITA to comply fully with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and resolution 1127 (1997) without any further delay.

My delegation would like to commend the troika countries and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, for the positive role they have played in the Angolan peace process. We cannot but encourage them to continue their efforts.

Mr. Wlosowicz (Poland): It is with a great deal of regret that we have had to meet today to consider yet another draft resolution concerning Angola. We regret it because we believe that this question should have already been solved.

It must be admitted that the international community committed itself to helping Angola out of its difficult situation. Here the Security Council has played a most prominent role. The question now is how much more we can do, and the answer is not much, if the parties in whose hands the fate of Angola rests are not ready to commit themselves at least as much as the international community. Many times in this Chamber we have appealed to UNITA to fully and promptly implement the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. Many times we believed the Lusaka Protocol would be implemented. But as we see now, we were wrong. This situation cannot last forever. So we call on UNITA yet again to rethink its attitude and to start concrete cooperation. This is the only possible route to restoring Angola's well-being.

Needless to say, we are not happy that the measures specified in paragraph 4 of resolution 1127 (1997) will come into force tonight. Yet we have supported them because we believe that at this stage this is the only way to force those to whom the measures are addressed to take the efforts of the international community seriously.

Believing that the parties to the conflict will soon resume effective cooperation, we support the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) until 30 January 1998. We are also of the view that in the present circumstances it is wise to postpone the withdrawal of the United Nations military formed units from Angola.

Mr. Da Rosa (Guinea-Bissau) (*interpretation from French*): For several years the entire international community and, especially, the Security Council have been working to restore peace and national reconciliation in Angola. Many efforts have been made in that direction, calling upon the parties, and in particular UNITA, to comply fully with the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol as anticipated. Unfortunately, the results we had hoped for have not materialized.

Given the gravity of the situation, characterized by the Secretary-General as precarious, the Security Council

adopted resolution 1127 (1997) on 28 August 1997 and resolution 1130 (1997) on 29 September 1997, again urging the parties concerned, and in particular UNITA, to comply fully with their commitments under the "Acordos de Paz" and the Lusaka Protocol.

Today, the Security Council is obliged once again to address the situation in Angola on the basis of the latest report of the Secretary-General, which unfortunately indicates that UNITA has not respected past commitments. Many pending issues remain, including the extension of State administration throughout the country, including Andulo and Bailundo, the demilitarization of UNITA forces and the transformation of radio Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting facility.

With respect to the Secretary-General's report, for which we are grateful, we support his recommendations to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) to 31 January 1998.

In conclusion, we would again like to state our interest in a meeting in Angola between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, with a view to creating a climate of confidence, which we think is indispensable for the consolidation of peace in Angola and which would moreover foster the true reconciliation of all Angolans.

Bearing in mind the reasons that we have just given, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution. We should like once again to thank the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr. Blondin Beye, as well the MONUA personnel, without overlooking the members of the troika, for their tireless efforts to re-establish lasting peace in Angola.

Mr. Liu Jieyi (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): Two months after the adoption of resolution 1127 (1997), no substantive progress has been achieved in the Angolan peace process. The peace that has been long awaited by the Angolan people continues to elude them. China is deeply concerned about this.

A complete end to many years of strife in Angola, the realization of Angolan national reconciliation and peace, and, in turn, the creation of conditions for the resumption of economic and social development in Angola, constitute the demand of the entire Angolan people. It is the common aspiration of numerous African countries, and it is also an important goal that the international community, including this Council, has been working for over a number of years.

In recent years, the hot spot issues in southern Africa have been resolved, one by one. The aspirations for peace, stability and development have already become a historical tide flowing over the entire African continent. China sincerely hopes that Angola will also swiftly complete its peace process and begin its reconstruction and development.

The key to the realization of peace in Angola lies in the parties concerned, particularly UNITA, their carrying out without delay the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol and other agreements between the two sides in Angola. Particularly with regard to disarmament and the normalization of State administration, UNITA should show its sincerity and adopt a cooperative and serious attitude.

As long as these tasks are not completed, there cannot possibly be genuine progress in the Angolan peace process. This would be in contravention of the will of the nation and people of Angola, and it is also something that the international community, including this Council, cannot agree to.

The draft resolution will give effect to measures for further sanctions against Angola as provided for in resolution 1127 (1997). It is well known that China has throughout taken a very cautious attitude towards sanctions in order that Angola can achieve peace at an early date.

As a special case, China voted in favour of resolution 1127 (1997). It will also vote in favour of the draft resolution. We wish to reiterate that sanctions are not an end in themselves, but are a means which had to be resorted to for the advancement of the peace process in Angola. We hope that the adoption of this draft resolution will help to make UNITA take a cooperative attitude towards the peace process, swiftly carry out all the obligations contained in the Lusaka Protocol and, under the overall leadership of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, make its own contribution to Angolan peace, stability and development.

Mr. Burleigh (United States of America): Today the United States will express its commitment to the peace process in Angola by voting to approve an extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The leadership of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the commitment of MONUA personnel and troop-contributing countries have been essential at each difficult

step in the peace process. As MONUA completes its important tasks, the United States will support the withdrawal of its formed military units.

The United States was deeply disturbed by the ambush of MONUA personnel and several other people on 23 October. We express our condolences to the families of those who lost their lives serving the goal of peace, and demand that those responsible for the attack be brought to justice. The Angolan parties must ensure that such incidents do not recur.

A month ago the Council cautiously welcomed signs that UNITA was fulfilling its obligations in the peace process. To encourage the apparent momentum, the Council postponed the imposition of sanctions for 30 days. We all hoped that UNITA would use the time to take the steps necessary to complete the peace process.

Throughout October the United States actively pressed Mr. Savimbi to meet UNITA's obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. Last Saturday Ambassador Richardson went to Bailundo to advise Mr. Savimbi that sanctions would go into effect if UNITA did not comply with resolution 1127 (1997). But UNITA did not comply. UNITA has even taken some backward steps, such as impeding the work of the administrators in areas recently transferred to Government control.

As Secretary of State Albright said during the ministerial session of the Security Council on 25 September, the United States believes this Council should penalize any party that fails to meet its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. We therefore support the automatic entry into force of the sanctions specified in resolution 1127 (1997). We will vigorously enforce these new measures as well as those measures imposed by resolution 864 (1993). We call on all Member States to do the same.

We hope that UNITA will see the imposition of these measures as a sign of the international community's determination that UNITA move rapidly to complete the remaining tasks in the peace process. If it does so, the United States stands ready to reconsider the need for sanctions. The burden is on UNITA.

However, there is a message in this draft resolution for the Government of Angola as well. This draft resolution calls on the Government to demonstrate restraint as it implements the final steps in the peace process. We believe that the peace process could be served by a meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi within the territory of Angola.

The United States and other members of the Council are gravely concerned by the Government of Angola's military intervention in the Republic of the Congo, which resulted in the overthrow of a democratically-elected President. This intervention is a violation of the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

We understand Angola's legitimate security concerns in Cabinda and its frustration over assistance provided by the Republic of the Congo to UNITA in contravention of existing United Nations sanctions. But military intervention is not an acceptable response. We condemn this intervention and demand that the Government of Angola immediately withdraw its forces. The Foreign Minister of Angola has made a public commitment to do so by 15 November. We expect this commitment to be honoured. We also demand that mercenaries and other armed groups, including UNITA, also withdraw immediately.

The United States urges both the Government of Angola and UNITA to refocus their efforts on peaceful, rather than military, solutions to internal and regional problems. The international community has supported the peace process patiently and generously over the past several years, but the Government, and especially UNITA, must now recommit themselves to this effort.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Chile.

We agree with the Secretary-General that it would be advisable to postpone for a short time the withdrawal from Angola of United Nations military units, and with his recommendation to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) for a further three months, until 30 January 1998. We shall vote in favour of the draft resolution.

We recall that in accordance with resolution 1130 (1997), tomorrow is the date for the entry into force of measures applicable to UNITA, agreed to by the Council in resolution 1127 (1997). We regret that this action is necessary and that UNITA has not taken the necessary steps to comply with the obligations set out in that resolution.

Nevertheless, we wish to note a matter of importance with regard to the Security Council's own work. With this group of resolutions — 1127 (1997), 1130 (1997) and the one that we are about to adopt — and as in the earlier cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone, we are affirming in the Council a new and positive trend with regard to the application of sanctions.

Sanctions are being aimed at the leaders responsible for situations of conflict or crisis, thereby avoiding their negative impact on innocent civilian populations. Sanctions aimed at those who bear responsibility should become the mechanism to which the Security Council has recourse whenever the need arises for such measures to be adopted.

At the same time, those in positions of responsibility at whom such sanctions are directed — in this case the leadership of UNITA — know that the Security Council will be prepared to review the measures adopted as soon as they act in conformity with the agreements they have made and with what the international community asks of them. Necessary measures have also been taken with respect to humanitarian issues.

In conclusion, the delegation of Chile appeals to the Government of Angola, but most particularly to UNITA, to complete without further delay the outstanding aspects of the peace process and to refrain from any act that might lead to renewed hostilities.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/1997/823.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Chile, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1135 (1997).

The Security Council expresses its grave concern regarding the presence of Angolan armed elements in the Republic of the Congo, as reported by the Secretariat.

The Security Council reaffirms the statement of its President of 16 October 1997 (S/PRST/1997/47). It condemns all external interference in the Republic of the Congo, calls on all foreign forces, including mercenaries, to withdraw immediately from that country, and stresses the importance of a political settlement, national reconciliation and transitional arrangements leading to the holding of democratic and free and fair elections with the participation of all parties as soon as possible.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.3828

Security Council

Fifty-second Year

Provisional

3828th Meeting

Wednesday, 29 October 1997, 6.10 p.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Somavía	(Chile)
Members:	China	Mr. Liu Jieyi
	Costa Rica	Mr. Saenz Biolley
	Egypt	Mr. Elaraby
	France	Mr. Dejammet
	Guinea-Bissau	Mr. Cabral
	Japan	Mr. Owada
	Kenya	Mr. Rana
	Poland	Mr. Wlosowicz
	Portugal	Mr. Monteiro
	Republic of Korea	Mr. Park
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Sweden	Mr. Dahlgren
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir John Weston
	United States of America	Mr. Burleigh

Agenda

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

97-86359 (E)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, *within one week of the date of publication*, to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

The meeting was called to order at 6.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have received photocopies of a letter dated 29 October 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a letter of the same date from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq to the President of the Security Council, which will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/1997/829.

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

> "The Security Council has considered the letter of 29 October 1997 from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq to the President of the Security Council conveying the unacceptable decision of the Government of Iraq to seek to impose conditions on its cooperation with the Special Commission, thereby preventing the Special Commission from discharging its responsibilities under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1051 (1996), 1060 (1996), 1115 (1997) and 1134 (1997).
>
> "The Security Council recalls its demands in resolution 1134 (1997) that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission in accordance with the relevant resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance.
>
> "The Security Council condemns the decision of the Government of Iraq to try to dictate the terms of its compliance with its obligation to cooperate with the Special Commission. It demands that Iraq cooperate fully, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and without conditions or restrictions, with the Special Commission in the implementation of its mandate. The Council furthermore reminds the Government of Iraq of its responsibility for the safety and security of the personnel of the Special Commission and its inspection teams.
>
> "The Security Council warns of the serious consequences of Iraq's failure to comply immediately and fully with its obligations under the relevant resolutions. The Council is determined to ensure rapid and full Iraqi compliance with the relevant resolutions and for that purpose will remain actively seized of the matter."

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/1997/49.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.